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This paper argues that sound principles of freedom of 
expression protect an individual's choice of which language to 
speak. They do so, not to guarantee against mistranslation, but 
rather to ensure that speakers are able to reach their intended 
audiences and, more importantly, to allow for the expressive 
value of speaking a particular language as a symbol of ethnic 
or political identification. The example of Quebec's Charter of 
the French Language and the resulting litigation is considered 




I. THE PROBLEM 
 
In linguistically divided countries, governments often regulate 
the use of language: they make some languages official, they 
restrict others, they impose linguistic requirements on educational 
or professional qualifications, and so on. My question is this: Do 
sound principles of free expression direct or constrain such 
regulation? 
The issue is a familiar one to Canadians whose federal 
government requires the use of French and English for certain 
                                                          
*
Versions of this paper were read to a conference on freedom of expression at 
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, and at the Boalt Hall School of Law, University 
of California, Berkeley. I am grateful to the participants, and to the editors and referees 
of this journal for helpful criticism. 
purposes, and whose provincial governments have often restricted 
one or the other. Historically, French and languages other than 
English bore the brunt of deliberate repression, but nationalist 
governments in Quebec have recently turned the tables and 
banned, in certain contexts, the use of English and other 
languages. Quebec's Charter of the French Language, for 
example, made French the sole official language of that province, 
and prohibited non- French commercial publicity, firm names and, 
with certain exceptions, public signs. 
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In a series of important and highly controversial judgments, the 
Supreme Court of Canada struck down some of these provisions as 
inconsistent with the guarantees of free expression found both in 
the entrenched Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 
also in Quebec's provincial human rights statute. These decisions 
were generally admired by English Canadians and, not surprisingly, 
deplored by the Quebec French. In consequence, the government 
of Quebec used its power under the Charter to derogate from the 
free expression guarantees, a decision that they may, in retrospect, 
have regretted. That action quickly polarized public sentiment 
and was among the factors making it impossible for Quebec to 
secure the agreement of all the majority-anglophone provinces on 
constitutional amendments which would have given it more control 
 
over its cultural affairs. Perhaps the linguistic division of opinion 
on the cases was to be expected. More surpris- ing, however, was 
the political division, for the decisions did not attract much 
support from liberal and left-wing academics either. They were 
dis- appointed to see the Court protecting commercial expression 
and to see it assisting a historically powerful group (English 
Quebeckers) against a historically weaker one (French 
Quebeckers). Groups who are normally friends of free expression 
were thus surprisingly hostile to the Supreme Court's defense of 
it in these cases. 
Part of the puzzle is explained by the fact that these cases 
involved commercial signs and that there are many liberals 
whose commitment to free expression does not reach that far. But 
it is, I think, quite wrong to let one's views about commercial 
expression occlude the broader issue here. First, some of the 
grounds on which Quebec defended its legislation (for instance, that 
its government enjoyed "democratic legitimacy," i.e. was elected) 
would permit the restriction of non-commercial expression as well. 
Second, some Quebec nationalists thought - and still think - that 
the impugned legislation did not go far enough in restricting 
English. Finally, the will to regulate more broadly was in any 
case manifest in the proposal of the Montreal Catholic School 
Commission to ban languages other than French from the 
playgrounds and corridors of their schools. None of this is 
resolved by one's views about commercial expression, so by 
focusing solely on that aspect liberals lost the opportunity to test 
their views more fully. 
Still, it is not obvious that a sound view of free expression 
should protect choice of language. (And here I mean morally, and 
not just legally, sound.) Indeed, some Canadians regard that 
suggestion as a kind of legalistic joke, rather as if one argued that 
the Oleomargarine Act, in requiring margarine to be dyed orange, 
wrongfully discriminates on grounds of color. But I want to 
suggest that this is mistaken and that free expression does properly 
extend so far as to protect choice of language. 
Principles of free expression protect expressive acts by 
imposing dis- abilities or duties on people, and they do so in 
order to protect such acts. The question whether freedom of 
expression protects choice of language thus needs to be 
distinguished from a broader question: Are there any principles 
of political morality that direct or constrain the regulation of 
language? 
The questions are importantly different. Governments should 
not, for instance, act irrationally. Since there is no evidence that 
 
Quebec's restrictions on external commercial signs would do 
more good than harm that is enough to impugn them, at least 
morally and perhaps constitutionally as well. But that is not an 
argument from free expression. Likewise, it is wrong to pay 
English-speaking workers more than French-speaking workers 
when language is irrelevant to the job. But the wrong is one of 
discrimination, not the violation of freedom of expression. 
Again, it would be wrong to punish people for speaking French 
at home. But the evil here is just that in prohibiting a 
harmless activity it restricts their personal liberty. 
Principles of rationality, non-discrimination, and personal 
liberty will in such ways often protect language use indirectly, 
as fallout from their central aims. Free expression plays an 
independent role only if it enhances these protections, if it 
protects language beyond what can be expected from other 
principles of political morality (Greenawalt, 1989: 9-10). That 
is the sort of principle I want to explore here. 
I follow Scanlon in regarding an expressive act as "any 
act that is intended by its agent to communicate to one or 
more persons some proposition or attitude" (Scanlon, 1972: 
206). Expressive acts are thus all those that bear the 
communicative intentions of some agent, whom for sake of 
simplicity we shall call the speaker. This must not, however, 
be taken to imply that all expressive acts are speech acts: 
writing, signalling, playing music, painting etc. can all be 
expressive, as can some criminal acts, including acts of 
terrorism and civil disobedience. Much fruitless debate in 
political theory is inspired by the narrow language of the First 
Amendment to the American Constitution which protects 
"freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." This has given rise to 
many unedifying attempts to distinguish speech and action. 
In contrast, section 2 of the Canadian Charter, like many 
other human rights documents, casts the net more broadly to 
catch: "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, 
including freedom of press and other media of 
communication" (Canadian Charter, 1982). That is, I think, a 
better way to demarcate the territory. Such unity as exists in the 
area flows, not from the fact that these are all in some obscure 
sense forms of "speech," but rather that they are all 
expressive. 
Generally, an act counts as expressive only if it attempts to 
get others to understand or share some proposition or attitude, 
and only if it does this communicatively, that is, by trying to 
get them to recognize that it is done with that intention. 
2
 I say, 
 
"proposition or atttitude," because it would be a poor and 
excessively rationalistic view of human communication to 
think that it only serves the communication of truths. The 
contents of communicative acts are quite diverse: we attempt to 
communicate to others, not only propositions or ideas to be 
believed, but attitudes and values to be shared. In the case of 
artistic expression, for example, communicative intent is hardly 
ever propositional. Attitudes, values, and dispositions all enter 
into our common life in important ways and are transmitted 
in part through their expression. In any case, so far as the 
Charter is concerned, the cognitive and the affective are both 
accommodated by the language itself which distinguishes the 
terms "thought," "belief " and "opinion" from the more 
general notion of "expression." 
The reasons for protecting such acts are, I believe, several 
and are grounded in the interests of speakers, of their 
audiences, and of the general public. Attempts to reduce these 
intersecting and sometimes competing considerations to a 
monistic theory have not met with great success,
3 for a cluster 
of different kinds of interests is at stake here. Surely 
consequentialist considerations, such as J.S. Mill's claim that 
free expression promotes knowledge of the truth, have weight 
(Mill, 1962: chap. 2). At the same time, it fosters and expresses 
both collective and individual autonomy: it serves democratic 
decision making, artistic and cultural endeavor, the expression 
of individual identity, and so on. Interestingly, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has explicitly endorsed such a pluralistic 
account of the grounds of free expression (Irwin Toy at 976-
77; Ford at 712) and that is the view I shall adopt here. 
I do want to reiterate, however, that the interests at stake in 
free expression are not, on this view, just individual ones. They 
have an important social dimension, recognition of which is, 
contrary to the allegations of some theorists, deeply rooted in 
the liberal tradition. Mill, for example, held that: "Were an 
opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; 
if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a 
private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury 
was inflicted only on a few persons or on many" (Mill, 1962: 
142). But, he continued, the restriction of opinion harms not 
just the individual but the public interest, and it is not just for 
the sake of a single speaker that we protect expression. To 
prevent even one person from speaking is wrong, not mainly 
because of the value of this liberty to her or to him, but 
because of the contribution it makes to the common good. 
 
Meiklejohn took the public interest justification even further, 
denying the speaker's interest any independent moral 
importance at all: "What is essential is not that everyone should 
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said" 
(Meiklejohn, 1960: 26). Of Course, principles of free expression 
do not require that everyone should speak; at most they require 
that everyone has the opportunity to speak or remain silent. 
And the connection between what is worth saying and what is 
worth protecting is more complex than Meiklejohn allows. We 
do not want to claim that a speaker's interest in uttering a 
banal, commonplace ideal should count for little merely on 
the ground that, having been said before, its contribution to the 
public interest is slight. Indeed, a single-minded concern that, as 
Meiklejohn puts it, "everything worth saying shall be said," 
could easily lead to the violation of what we normally think of 
as paradigm rights of free expression. We do not believe that 
only those things worth saying should be permitted to be said 
nor even that scarce resources should be apportioned among 
speakers according to how socially valuable their views are. 
Moreover, in some cases we do regard it as important that 
everyone has an opportunity to speak, 
 
even if that means that the amount of time devoted to the 
worthless and the worthwhile is about the same. Meiklejohn 
thought his argument a democratic one, but the notion that 
everyone should speak in fact has deep roots in democratic theory, 
beginning with the classical Greek notion of isogoria. While the 
public interest is essential to understanding the full importance of 
freedom of expression, there is also an individual interest that 




II. MEDIUM AND MESSAGE 
 
There is an objection, however, to thinking that choice of 
language should be protected by such principles. They protect 
expressive acts in virtue of their expressive character; but not all 
features of such acts are expressive. For example, it is commonly 
thought that free expression does not protect the time, manner, or 
place of expression. Thus the regulation of radio frequencies, or 
the quality and supply of paper during war time, or the 
chemical additives present in artists' paints and materials, may all 
have effects on the character and quality of expressive acts, and 
 
may at the margin even inhibit some forms of expression and 
promote others. But, according to the proposed distinction they 
would count as regulation of the media of communication only 
and not of the message itself. These normally bear, the argument 
goes, on the form rather than content of expression. Likewise, it 
may be said, whether the medium of expression is French, 
English or Cree, the message remains invariant, so restrictions of 
medium need not offend principles of free expression. 
That was how one Canadian court saw the issue. In Irwin 
Toy, a case testing the constitutionality of legislation restricting 
advertising directed at children, Hugessen, A.C.J. introduced a 
distinction which was to prove pivotal. He said, "The late Dr 
McLuhan notwithstanding, message and medium are, in law, two 
very different things" (Irwin Toy at 58). He held that a legislature 
which regulates or restricts the medium in which some message 
is communicated is not regulating or restricting the message itself 
and thus cannot be said to be regulating or restricting any 
expressive act. 
This reasoning also dominates the trial judgment in Devine 
which, though overturned on appeal, nicely puts the objection 
we now consider. Dugas, J. applied the distinction between 
medium and message to the case of language: "Language, after 
all, is nothing more than a code of written or oral signs, used by 
those who know it to communicate with each other" (Devine at 
375). Prohibiting the use of a particular code, he stated, does not 
therefore interfere with the communicative intention, for any 
other code might be used to express the same propositions or 
attitudes. Hence "Freedom of expression does not include the 
freedom to choose the language of expression" (Devine at 379). 
 
There are many interesting and important aspects of these 
judgments that we need not consider here. What I do want to 
focus on is the central distinction between medium and message 
and the use to which it was put. The reasoning seems to have gone 
something like this: 
1. Only expressive acts are candidates for the protection of 
freedom of expression; 
2. A language is nothing more than a content-neutral code; 
3. Thus, restricting the choice of language cannot restrict any 
expressive act. 
Now I have already endorsed (1) and suggested some of the 
reasons one might have for protecting such acts, so let us turn to 
(2). The word "code" which I draw from the judgment is 
 
unhappy, suggesting as it does an artificial medium used in place 
of a natural language. The fact that the same meaning may be 
borne by a sentence spoken in English and the same English 
sentence sent over the wire in Morse code would hardly suffice to 
establish the semantic equivalence of that sentence and its best 
French translation. There are codes and then there are "codes." 
We must take care not to become enchanted with the jargon of 
some fashionable linguistic theory. The sense in (2) just amounts 
to this: it is roughly true that anything that can be said in English 
can also be said in French. But, as we shall see below, the fact 
that this is only roughly true allowed the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Ford to reject (2) and the inference drawn from it. That result 
was not too surprising, for there were plenty of other clouds on the 
horizon for this distinction, at least as a matter of law. 
First, medium of communication is expressly mentioned in the 
Charter as being included in the guarantees of section 2. It is true 
that, in that context, the central cases of such media are the press 
and airwaves, but neither the language of the constitution nor the 
decided cases inhibits its development by analogy. Even if medium 
is distinct from message, in at least some cases the Canadian 
constitution finds reasons for protecting both. 
Second, the following words of an earlier Supreme Court 
judgment suggest a view of language as something more than a 
content-neutral code: 
The importance of language rights is grounded in the 
essential role that language plays in human existence, 
development and dignity. It is through language that we 
are able to form concepts; to structure and order the 
world around us. Language bridges the gap between 
isolation and community, allowing human beings to 
delineate the rights and duties they hold in respect of one 
another, and thus to live in society. (Reference re: 
Manitoba Language Rights at 19) 
Finally, and perhaps most important for present purposes, this 
view of language seemed inconsistent with the very statute the 
trial judge was attempting to interpret. For its preamble opens 
with the ringing declaration that "the French language . . . is the 
instrument by which that people [i.e. Quebeckers] has articulated 
its identity" (Charter of the French Language, 1977). As 
Boudreault, J. shrewdly observed in the trial judgment in Ford , 
this makes it very difficult to suppose that the legislators 
conceived of language merely as a neutral code and thus that they 
intended that the Act should regulate its use only in that respect 
 
(Ford at 724). 
So in deciding as it did, the Supreme Court certainly had a 
reasonable footing: nothing in Canadian law prohibited their 
finding that freedom of expression includes the freedom to 
choose one's language and there was enough directing them along 
that path. But was it, in the end, a wise decision? Can it be 




III. A SEMANTIC ARGUMENT 
 
One of the arguments the Supreme Court accepted, and one that 
has an obvious appeal, is to deny the premise of the objection. 
If it is wrong to think of a natural language as a content-neutral 
code, then it is wrong to think that regulating the code is not 
regulating content. Thus, in Ford the Court unanimously rejected 
(2) in the following words: 
Language is so intimately related to the form and content of 
expression that there cannot be true freedom of expression 
by means of language if one is prohibited from using the 
language of one's choice. Language is not merely a means 
or medium of expression; it colors the content and meaning 
of expression. 
4
 (Ford at 748) 
The Court thus exploits the inevitable haziness of the boundary 
between medium and message. That what can be said in French 
can also be said in English is only roughly true because choice of 
language colors the content and meaning of expression. Language 
is not, therefore, a content-neutral code. 
Was the Court right about that? It is true that the expressive 
power of language varies, and that exact synonymy may be 
unavailable in some cases. Considering cultural resonance and 
sonorities, it would be hard to say that there are no semantic 
differences between the roughly equivalent idioms, "filer a 
l'anglais" and "to take French leave." Language does in such cases 
color the meaning of the expression. 
But is this sufficiently important and pervasive to bring choice 
of language under the comprehensive protection of free 
expression? I do not think so. Valerie Ford's offense, after all, 
was to have displayed the word "wool" alongside "laine" in the 
window of her wool shop. It is surely not to secure against any 
possible semantic slippage that we would defend her right to 
freedom of expression. This is not to deny that such slippage can 
occur, even in the context of commercial signs. A "depanneur" 
 
is not exactly a "convenience store." The differences in meaning 
are real; but they are occasional and do not matter much. If we 
are about to impose duties and disabilities on people as a matter of 
general policy we must make sure that the stakes are high enough 
to warrant it. To show that language does in some cases flavor 
the meaning of expression will not warrant adopting a general 
policy of protecting choice of language just in order to catch such 
cases of heteronymy. The availability of circumlocutions, or the 
adoption of some foreign words and terms, would be a 
satisfactory alternative. 
For this reason the tempting analogy with obscenity is 
misguided. One might initially be inclined to regard choice of 
natural language as being on a par with choice of tone or force 
and, reasoning along the lines of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Cohen v. California, argue that to restrict language is to restrict a 
whole mode of communication. But to exclude obscene or vulgar 
speech from the protections of free expression is to remove a 
distinctive tool, one which might prove useful or even necessary in 
circumstances that cannot easily be isolated in advance
5
. The 
potential heteronymy of French and English near-equivalents is 
neither as pervasive nor as unidirectional as the power of vulgar 
speech, so the analogy is unhelpful. There just isn't a general 
linguistic tone or pragmatic effect that accrues to speaking 
English in the way that one might be thought to accrue to speaking 
vulgarly. So while it is certainly true as a descriptive matter that 
semantic slippage occurs, it is hard to endorse the normative 
thesis that this is what ought to bring choice of language under 
the protective umbrella of free expression. 
 
 
IV. AN INSTRUMENTAL ARGUMENT 
 
A better route to the protection of choice of language is surely 
the instrumental one. Restricting the use of certain languages 
simply cuts off potential audiences or makes it more difficult to 
reach them, and that harms one of the core interests underlying 
freedom of expression on any plausible account. 
To take a clear example: suppose a government restricted the 
language in which political commentary might appear in the 
newspapers, requiring that all published criticism of its policies 
be in Ojibway, while favorable comment could be in any 
language. What matters here is not the possible semantic slippage, 
but the closing down of channels of communication by restricting 
both speakers and their potential audiences. 
 
Now this argument bears, one must concede, less heavily on 
requirements than on prohibitions. Canada's Official Languages 
Act of 1969, for example, requires various officials and 
government agencies to use both French and English, and 
Quebec's Charter of the French Language makes wide use of such 
requirements in order to promote the use of French in the working 
world. And they do so partly for instrumental reasons that are 
ultimately based on audience interests. The Charter of the French 
Language, for example, seeks to establish French as the normal 
working language of commerce and government in Quebec thereby 
directly protecting the substantial interest that the francophone 
majority has in being able to understand communications of all 
sorts. It is important to note, moreover, that the audience interest 
is not exhausted by the immediate benefits of intelligible 
communication. It is well-known that patterns of language use 
will also have substantial secondary effects on people's life 
chances, including their opportunities for education, occupational 
advancement, and social and geographic mobility. 
Now, in the case of intended audiences, speakers will 
generally aim to communicate in a language that the audience 
understands. We should not, however, assume on that basis that 
everyone's interests can be best served without any regulation of 
language at all. The free market can fail in language as it can 
elsewhere. When the audience is linguistically fragmented there 
may be complex problems of coordination involved in finding a 
common language. When minorities are bi- or multilingual there 
is the potential for collective action problems in sustaining the 
use of minority languages, and there is the risk of majorities 
oppressing linguistic minorities. Nonetheless, it is easy to see 
why speakers have an interest in the freedom to use the language 
that they feel is best suited to their audiences. Unintended 
audiences also have an interest in the intelligibility of 
communication, however. It matters not only what others say to 
you, but what is being said generally. Since speakers have 
weaker, and in some cases no, incentives to serve the needs of 
unintended audiences, this may provide another reason for 
required use. 
Might one argue that forcing someone to use a language other 
than the one he or she would otherwise use in that context limits 
the speaker's choice of medium and therefore must, at the very 
least, call for a persuasive justification? To assess this claim, one 
must investigate more closely the structure of speaker's interest. 
In part, it derives from the intended audience's interest in 
intelligible communication: the intention to reach them is 
 
frustrated if one cannot do so. But we are not now considering 
a case in which the speaker's audience is limited by prohibition, 
but only a case in which the potential audience is expanded. A 
requirement that commercial signs and publicity be in French as 
well as another language, for example, does not inhibit the 
speaker's capacity to communicate with the audience at which the 
signs are directed. Could a speaker wish that a certain audience 
not receive a particular communication? No doubt, although 
plausible cases will turn, not on freedom of expression, but on 
the right to privacy. 
The instrumental argument for protection for choice of 
language is thus an important one, though it may fail in some 
circumstances. Widespread individual bilingualism, or even the 
availability of convenient translation, lessens its force. A more 
discriminating policy of protecting choice of language where it is 
necessary for effective communication might answer to the same 
concerns and have fewer costs. And over time languages can be 
learned, so the need to do so stimulates investment in language 
learning. Quebec's language regime weighs less heavily on the 
anglophone community now than it would have done twenty years 
ago. Such are the limitations on the instrumental argument, so it 
seems unlikely that general protection for choice of language 
could be completely defended on instrumental grounds alone. 
V. AN EXPRESSIVE ARGUMENT 
 
There is, however, a third and independent reply to the objection 
that language is merely a non-expressive medium of 
communication, one noticed though not much elaborated by the 
Supreme Court. Choice of language should be protected because 
it is an expression of identity and individuality: 
It is, as the preamble of the Charter of the French 
Language itself indicates, a means by which a people may 
express its cultural identity. It is also the means by which 
the individual may express his or her personal identity 
and sense of individuality. (Devine at 375) 
This is an aspect of the romantic, as opposed to rationalist, 
tradition in free expression. Its context is not the forum or 
marketplace of ideas, but rather the organic relations between an 
individual and his or her community. I say this is an independent 
objection, for it may succeed even where the instrumental 
argument fails, and even when the thesis of content-neutrality 
holds. Returning now to the argument set out in section 2, above, 
we can see a further mistake. The thesis of content-neutrality does 
 
not show that a natural language is "nothing more than a code." 
Compare the following inference: 
4. A flag is a piece of cloth, 
5 . Therefore, a flag is nothing more than a piece of cloth. 
The conclusion does not follow because a flag can be both a piece 
of cloth and something more than a piece of cloth. Likewise, a 
language can be a content-neutral code and something more 
than a content-neutral code. If the something more makes it 
expressive, then the fact that it may also appropriately be 
described as a neutral code cannot change that. 
To be still more precise, we do not even need to show that 
language is something more than a neutral code in order to 
justify the protection we want to accord it. Even if it were true that 
a natural language is nothing but a neutral code, and even if 
restrictions on language would not restrict the potential audience, 
the argument given above would still be invalid. For consider: 
6. Choice of language is a candidate for protection of free 
expression only if it is an expressive act; 
7. Language is nothing more than a neutral code; 
8. So, freedom of expression does not include freedom to choose 
language of expression. 
Even if (7) were true, (8) would still not follow, for (8) is about 
choice of language, and not about language itself. The error thus 
lies not just in the arguable falsehood of (7), but in an 
equivocation between "language" as an abstract entity and 
"choice of language" as an act. Invoking again our earlier 
analogy, we might compare: 
 
9. Waving a flag is a candidate for protection of free 
expression only if it is an expressive act; 
10. A flag is nothing more than a piece of cloth; 
11. So, freedom of expression does not include freedom to 
wave a flag. 
 
Here, the fallacy is patent, for the supposed truth of (10) 
plainly has nothing whatever to do with (11). A flag, like a 
language, is not an act of any kind, let alone an expressive 
one. But speaking a particular language, like waving a flag, is 
indeed an act and very possibly expressive. Thus, the purported 
distinction between medium and message is irrelevant. The 
fact, if it be one, that medium and message are two different 
things does not even begin to show that choice of medium 
cannot be intended to convey a message. 
 
It is important to distinguish between the expressive 
argument defended here and the semantic argument that I 
rejected above. Suppose it were permitted to say "Long live a 
free Quebec!" but prohibited to say " Vive le Quebec fibre!" 
What is most significant: the fact that there are nuances of 
meaning, historical and cultural resonances, poetics of sound 
present in " Vive" but absent from "long live"? I doubt it. The 
significance of choice of language here lies not in what it says 
but in what it shows. Saying it in French is a doubly political 
act, for the propositional content is backed up by the fact that 
the utterance displays the legitimacy of the language and its 
relation to nationhood. 
The argument we are pursuing is a normative one, but it 
does depend on certain social facts. It fails unless it actually is 
the case that language use has a social or individual meaning. 
This cannot be established a priori. But at least in Canada 
there is plenty of evidence that in many contexts it does. As I 
said earlier, the expressive function of language was not 
missed even by the legislators. The Charter of the French 
Language begins, "Whereas the French language, the distinctive 
language of a people that is in the majority French-speaking, is 
the instrument by which that people has articulated its identity. 
. . ."
6
 What is distinctively nationalistic here is merely the 
suggestion that a group of people who are only "in  the 
majority" francophone constitute "a people." The reality in a 
pluralistic society is that language choice permits each people 
to express its identity. The way this is done is largely a social 
creation, governed by convention, context and history.
7
 In 
Canada, choice of language bears a number of meanings, of 
which ethnic identification and political affirmation are the 
most important. 
Those who choose to use a particular language often thereby 
signal their sense of identification with an ethnic or cultural 
group. This is most commonly true of minority language 
speakers in circumstances where use of their language imposes 
some social or economic cost. The language establishes a link 
with an intended audience, a link which simultaneously invokes a 
boundary between those inside and those outside the group. This 
mark of distinction is often a source of value to minority 
language speakers, and legitimately so. Notice that ethnic 
identification may be expressed even by those who are 
monolingual minority-language speakers. The notion of "choice" 
in play may well be an attenuated one. For language use to have 
the expressive character I have attributed to it, it is not 
 
necessary that a person deliberately use one language and avoid 
another in circumstances where options are available. The 
expressive act need not be, for example, speaking Italian instead 
of English, but simply speaking Italian instead of remaining 
silent or allowing others to speak on one's behalf. 
Language may also be an expression of political identity. 
Quebec's policies of francisation express not only a boundary-
defining sense of common feeling, but also a political position 
which celebrates the distinctiveness of Quebec society and its 
aspirations for autonomy. It is no accident that minority language 
use is often a political marker, and not surprising that 
suppression of such languages is often undertaken with political 
aims in mind. The various forms of compulsion to which 
Estonian, Croatian, or Welsh speakers have been subject by their 
governments was motivated by a desire to suppress social 
formations which embody and promote nationalist 
politics. 
8 That repression was unjust, but it was not ill-informed: 
use of those languages was indeed a political act. 
Here again, the consequences of requiring the use of a certain 
language are likely to differ from those of prohibiting the use of 
others. The decision not to use a particular language may in some 
circumstances be expressive: it may be an act of resistance. In 
other cases, it may be understood that to use a particular language 
is not necessarily to identify with the ethnic group whose 
language it characteristically is, nor to endorse any political 
view. A language may simply be, and be understood to be, a lingua 
franca. More- over, the burden of required use may be partly 
alleviated by the division of labor. Organizations like companies 
and bureaucracies may have the power to arrange their affairs so 
that, for example, only those willing to use English must do so. 
And where the regulations apply directly to individuals, they often 
do so only for limited contexts and purposes. This is not to deny 
that required use is ever onerous. When language has become 
politically charged with the burden of nationality, use of language 
is almost inevitably an expressive act. Both prohibitions and 
requirements on use limit that expression, though generally in 
different degrees. 
Unlike the semantic thesis, the expressive thesis is pervasive: the 
use of a language may have an expressive function without regard 
to subject matter. The sign in Valerie Ford's shop had a social and 
political significance quite apart from its semantic content. Indeed, 
Quebec nationalists have often correctly noticed that the use of 
English by merchants is not purely a matter of commercial 
expediency but is in part a collective non placet, sometimes even a 
 
political provocation. To denounce it in one breath and then in 
the next defend prohibitions on English on the ground that they 
merely regulate a neutral code is either blindness or hypocrisy. 
Since this expressive character may break out at any point, 
even on a commercial sign, there seems to be no way one might 
adopt narrower protections to serve the same ends. Unlike the 
instrumental argument, the expressive argument is capable of 
supporting broader principles. The strongest objection to this 
argument is rather different. It is that the interests at stake are 
not sufficiently weighty or general to warrant holding others duty-
bound to protect them or disabling them from infringing them. Is 
that a credible position? The power of ethnicity and nationality in 
organizing personal identity, the widely felt need for rootedness, 
and the structuring power of culture all suggest that identification 
with an ethnic group may be a substantial human good. 
Expressing such identification is good to the extent that it 
constitutes, reinforces and adapts it. 
Perhaps one might object that these interests, though powerful, 
are purely private. A follower of Chafee, for example, might be 
tempted in that direction. He saw the underlying values of free 
expression to be these: 
There is an individual interest, the need of men to 
express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is 
to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment 
of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the 
wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way. 
9
 
(Chafee, 1964: 33) 
Ignoring the social interest, Chafee thought, leads people 
systematically to underestimate the importance of free speech. 
But his view of what the social interest actually comprises is an 
implausibly narrow one. The expressive need is not merely 
individual, nor is the social interest merely that of attaining the 
truth. Sound public policy is to be guided, not merely by the true, 
but by the good. There is a common interest in a regime which 
enables and supports the expression and exploration of ethnic 
identities, at least when these help structure valuable forms of 
life. Not only is this good in itself, but it indirectly contributes to 
a climate of ethnic tolerance and to the public good of linguistic 
security, so that each may speak his or her mother tongue without 
unfair pressure to conform. The expressive interest is thus of 
general value and not what Mill called a "personal possession;" its 
violation is not merely a "private injury" (Mill, 1962). 
It is here, I think, that one finds the deepest and most important 
roots of free expression and why, of the three arguments I have 
 
canvassed, the expressive one is so important in completing the 
case for protecting choice of language. 
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1. The Original Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11, provides that "Except as 
may be pro- vided under this act or the regulations of the Office de 
la langue franraise, signs and posters and commercial advertising 
shall be solely in the official [i.e. French] language." Similarly, s. 69 
prohibits non-French firm names. Section 58 exempts publicity 
carried in publications circulating in languages other than French, 
and religious, political, ideological or humanitarian 
communications provided that they are not of commercial character 
(s. 59). Nor does it apply to small businesses of less than four 
employees, to publicity for the cultural activities of non-French 
ethnic groups, or to business specializing in foreign or ethnic 
goods. 
2. The qualification is necessary because an act can try to get others to 
share a belief in some other way. If A wants B to think it is cold in 
the room, A can achieve this communicatively, e.g. by telling B that 
it is cold, or non-communicatively, e.g. by opening a window and 
making B cold. The second does not require for its success that B 
recognize A's intention in opening the window, and thus is not a 
communicative act in the sense under discussion here. 
3. Alexander Meiklejohn, for instance, thought that speech should be 
protected only when it can be reliably thought to promote self-
government. Thus it excludes commercial radio broadcasts: "The 
radio, as we now have it, is not cultivating those qualities of taste, 
of reasoned judgment, of integrity, of loyalty, of mutual 
understanding upon which the enterprise of self-government 
depends. On the contrary, it is a mighty force for breaking them 
down" (Meiklejohn, 1960: 87). What would he have thought of 
comic books, pop music, or television? 
4. There is in fact a complication in the judgment, for while the 
above passage suggests that choice of language is protected 
because regulation of language is regulation of content, the Court 
also says that the reference in s. 2 to freedom of "thought," 
"belief," and "opinion" shows that the Charter's protections go 
beyond what it calls "mere content," or at least "content of 
expression in its narrow sense." 
5. Cf. Kopyto per Corry, J.A., at 226: "Hyperbole and colourful, 
perhaps even disrespectful language, may be the necessary 
touchstone to fire the interest and imagination of the public to the 
need for reform, and to suggest the manner in which that reform 
may be achieved." Per Goodman, J.A., at 259: "The expression of 
an opinion which may be lawfully expressed in mild, polite, 
temperate, or scholarly language does not become unlawful 
because it is expressed in crude, vulgar, impolite, or acerbic 
words." 
6. The equally authoritative French version reads: "Langue distinctive 
d'un peuple majoritairement francophone, la langue franraise 
permet au peuple quebecois d'exprimer son identite." 
7. The context-dependence of meaning provides an illustration of the 
limits of abstract argument in political philosophy. One cannot 
resolve these issues solely by appeal to our concepts of 
'expression,' 'language,' etc. It is no thesis of mine that choice of 
language is always, universally, or necessarily protected by 
principles of free expression. I am merely trying to identify cases 
in which it is. Does this need to attend to context suggest that 
language is ill-suited for protection by constitutionally entrenched 
rights? I make no claims about that here: the question turns on 
the nature of rights, and on moral and institutional arguments for 
putting certain matters beyond the reach of ordinary politics. The 
issues are well-known. But I might note one general point. One 
might object that, in view of the social character of our interests in 
language, it must be an inappro- priate matter for rights, for they 
only protect individuated interests. The objec- tion is too hasty, 
for it elides a number of interestingly different ways in which 
interests may fail to be fully individuated. For example, 
individuals may have rights to certain collective goods. See, Green 
(1991) and cf. Reaume (1988). 
8. Political affirmation is often but not always coincident with ethnic 
identification. Some bilingual Canadians use their second official 
language in post offices or at border crossings in order to make a 
political statement without thereby intending to express any sense 
of ethnic identification with the other group. 
9. The passage refers to the interests protected by the First 
Amendment to the American Constitution, but there is no 
evidence that Chafee thought that there were any important 




CHAFEE, ZECHARIAH (1964) Free Speech in the United States. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. 
GREEN, LESLIE (1991) "Two Views of Collective Rights," Canadian 
Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 4: 315-27. 
GREENAWALT, KENT (1989) Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language. 
New York: 
 
Oxford Univ. Press. 
MEIKLEJOHN, ALEXANDER (1960) Political Freedom: the Constitutional 
Powers of the People. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 
MILL, JOHN STUART (1962) Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Essay on 
Bentham edited by Mary Warnock. New York: New American Library. 
REAUME, DENISE (1988) "Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public 
Goods," Univer- sity of Toronto Law Journal 38: 1-28. 
SCANLON, THOMAS (1972) "A Theory of Freedom of Expression," 





Cohen v. California (1971) 403 U.S. 15. 
Devine c. P.O. Quebec et P.O. du Canada mis en cause (1982) C.S. 
355 (Can.) 
Ford v. A.G. Quebec (1984) 18 D.L.R. (4th) 711 (Can.) 
Ford v. A.G. Quebec (1988) 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.) 
Irwin Toy Ltd. c. P.O. du Quebec et Gilles Moreau (1982) 
C.S. 96 (Can.) Reference re: Manitoba Language Rights 
(1985) 19 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Can.) R. v. Kopyoto (1988) 47 






CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS s. 2(b), Part I of the 
CONSTITUTION 
ACT OF 1982 being Schedule B of the CANADA ACT OF 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, chap. 11. 
CHARTER OF THE FRENCH LANGUAGE R.S.Q. 1977 c.C-11 (Can.) 
OFFICIAL LANGUAGES ACT OF 1969 
